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ABSTRACT Security issues in cyber-physical systems are of paramount importance due to the often safety-
critical nature of its associated applications. A first step in understanding how to protect such systems requires
an understanding of emergent weaknesses, in part, due to the cyber-physical coupling. In this paper, we
present a framework that models a class of cyber-physical switching vulnerabilities in smart grid systems.
Variable structure system theory is employed to effectively characterize the cyber-physical interaction of the
smart grid and demonstrate how existence of the switching vulnerability is dependent on the local structure of
the power grid. We identify and demonstrate how through successful cyber intrusion and local knowledge of
the grid an opponent can compute and apply a coordinated switching sequence to a circuit breaker to disrupt
operation within a short interval of time. We illustrate the utility of the attack approach empirically on the
Western Electricity Coordinating Council three-machine, nine-bus system under both model error and partial
state information.
INDEX TERMS Cyber-physical systems, security modeling, variable structure systems, coordinated
switching attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are witnessing the rapid technological evolution of
numerous application fields including power systems,
robotics and social networking. These systems will evolve
into next-generation cyber-physical systems providing a spec-
trum of advantages over their predecessors. However, cyber-
enablement of these systems naturally leads to issues of secu-
rity requiring approaches to resilient system design. Tools for
modeling cyber-physical systems are of paramount impor-
tance in enabling the judicious planning and vulnerability
analysis.
A vulnerability in a system exists when there is a
weakness in the system, access to the weakness and a capa-
bility by an opponent to exploit the weakness. We investigate
a novel theoretical modeling framework based on variable
structure system theory that enables the identification of a
class of reconfiguration-based weaknesses in the power grid
employing formal mathematical principles. Such an approach
provides a prescriptive strategy to identify possible ways to
trigger rotor angle instability in synchronous generators of
power systems. Moreover, our model allows us to deduce
steps for practical attack construction that are amenable to
simulation demonstrating the potential capability of an oppo-
nent to exploit the flaw.
We assume that access to the flaw is facilitated through
smart grid communication channels providing opponent(s)
opportunities for remotely controlling physical power system
components such as modern circuit breakers possibly via
illicit security breaches and intrusion. Thus, our vulnerability
is applicable to a smart grid system with remotely connected
circuit breakers and one or more synchronous generators used
as targets making it relevant to a broad class of modern and
future power transmission systems.
We name the class of attacks that stems from our
framework coordinated variable structure switching attacks
whereby an opponent aims to destabilize the power grid by
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leveraging corrupted communication channels and/or control
signaling to hijack relevant circuit breakers. Our work repre-
sents a novel departure from existing smart grid vulnerability
analysis research in that it represents the first use of variable
structure system theory for attack performance analysis. This
enables a prescriptive approach to vulnerability identification
in contrast tomethods that make use of reverse-engineering or
ad hoc ‘‘what-if’’ analysis [1]–[12] leading to the identifica-
tion of a new class of reconfiguration-based vulnerabilities.
Moreover, we extend our recent work [13]–[15] by enhancing
the theoretical foundation to better characterize the impact
of attacks and perform necessarily robustness analysis of the
attack construction under practical constraints of model error
and partial information.
In the next section we focus on our attack develop-
ment. Attack existence and characterization are presented in
Section III. Attack construction and impact are studied in
Sections IV and V. We then address issues involving limi-
tations on attacker capability in Section VI followed by final
remarks in Section VIII.
II. COORDINATED SWITCHING ATTACKS
A. SLIDING MODE IN VARIABLE STRUCTURE SYSTEMS
Variable structure systems are nonlinear systems charac-
terized by discontinuous dynamics [16]. Such systems are
considered to exhibit both continuous and discrete forms
of behavior much needed for the modeling cyber-physical
systems while being conducive to software implementation.
Consider the following elementary variable structure system
described as:
x˙ =
{
f1(x, t), s(x) > 0
f2(x, t), s(x) ≤ 0 , (1)
where x ∈ Rn×1 is the system state vector, fi(x, t) ∈ Rn×1
represents subsystem dynamics for i = 1, 2, s(x) ∈ R is a
state-dependent switching signal (sometimes denoted simply
as s), and s(x) = 0 is called the n-dimensional switching
surface. The state is a time-dependent quantity and therefore
could also be denoted x(t). The evolution of x in time through
state space is called the state trajectory of the system.
Eq. (1) represents a system which abruptly switches
dynamics between f1(x, t) and f2(x, t) according to the sign
of s(x) and is effective in modeling the action of a circuit
breaker in power systems. A block diagram linking a simple
power system to Eq. (1) is provided in Fig. 1 to elucidate;
here, the state vector x represents the physical quantities of
generator phase angle and frequency. When the power system
switch changes positions between loads Z1 (Position 1) and
Z2 (Position 2) it has the effect of changing between system
dynamics denoted f1(x, t) and f2(x, t), respectively.
Analysis of the system in Eq. (1) leads to a number of
interesting properties one of which is termed sliding mode
behavior [16], [17]. In the sliding mode, the state trajectory
of the system of (1) is attracted and subsequently confined
to the switching surface s(x) = 0, which in this case is also
termed the sliding surface.
FIGURE 1. Elementary variable structure system example.
(a) Elementary power system. (b) Block diagram.
There are two crucial aspects to this phenomenon. The first
necessary condition is that the switching surface is attractive
meaning that within some subset of state space, trajectories
converge to the switching surface making it a sliding surface.
The second requirement is that the variable structure system
behavior, confined to the sliding surface, exhibits certain
desired properties such as asymptotic stability, exponential
growth or oscillation. We assert that this collective behavior
can be used to steer the state into a position of instability for
attack.
Consider a specific case of Eq. (1) assuming linear dynam-
ics, n = 2 and x = [x1, x2]T :
x˙ =

A1x, s(x) > 0, where A1 =
[−1 −10
3 −0.3
]
A2x, s(x) ≤ 0, where A2 =
[−0.3 3
−10 −1
] (2)
for some s(x). The state trajectory x(t), as governed by its
dynamics, can be viewed geometrically in a phase portrait.
The phase portraits of the individual subsystems A1 and A2
(i.e., assuming static switch positions of 1 and 2, respec-
tively) are shown in both Fig. 2(a) and (b) as dashed and
dash-dot lines, respectively. As can be observed, both sub-
system trajectories converge to the stable equilibrium point
(0, 0) from the initial condition (25,−25). Moreover, it can
be shown that because the subsystems are linear they are each
globally asymptotically stable meaning that the trajectories
will always converge to (0, 0) from any initial condition in
R2 [18]. Thus, in this example, we can deduce that the system
of Eq. (2) is stable when the switch is static in either position.
This is analogous to a well-designed power systemwhich will
be stable for either an open or closed static breaker condition.
Variable structure system theory can be used to design
a switching signal s(x) to achieve certain desired system
behaviors in Eq. (1). Traditionally, s(x) has been designed
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FIGURE 2. Sliding mode system trajectories of Eq. 2 in the
presence of variable structure switching. (a) For s(x) = −x1 + x2.
(b) For s(x) = x1 + x2.
to stabilize the variable structure system [16]. In this paper,
we deviate from this philosophy and study how s(x) may
be selected by an attacker to steer the trajectory of Eq. (1)
to instability thus enabling large-scale disruption in the
associated power system. In Fig. 1(a) this would equate to
destabilizing the generator angle and frequency resulting in
transient instability of the smart grid system.
Consider the linear subsystem example of Eq. 2. We con-
sider the following two selections for the switching signal
s(x), s(x) = −x1 + x2 and s(x) = x1 + x2, with associated
phase portraits shown in Fig. 2(a) and (b), respectively. As is
evident both selections instigate sliding mode behavior as
convergence to the s(x) = 0 line is clearly observed. The
former however results in stable sliding mode behavior while
the latter results in instability. Making a simple analogy to
smart grid systems, we thus purport that it may be possible for
an opponent who can control the state of a circuit breaker to
determine an s(x), and hence a switching sequence, that can
destabilize the overall switched power system even though
it is designed to exhibit stable behavior when the breaker is
static.
B. ATTACK ASSUMPTIONS AND OVERVIEW
To leverage variable structure system theory for cyber-
physical attack development in a smart grid, an opponent
would therefore need:
(A) to first identify a (physical) target component to
attack (i.e., destabilize);
(B) electromechanical switching control over a cor-
rupted circuit breaker (or equivalent) in the target’s
proximity;
(C) a local model of the smart grid system in the vicinity
of the target and breaker; and
(D) knowledge of the target’s state x.
Knowledge of a local model of the smart grid is a common
assumption made in other attack literature [19], [20]. Condi-
tions (A) and (C) collectively enable the identification of a
variable structure system model of the smart grid to design
a switching signal s(x), if one exists, that instigates unsta-
ble sliding mode behavior; this establishes the first stage of
attack construction. Conditions (B) and (D) allow implemen-
tation of the attack in the second stage of attack execution. In
Sec. VI we relax Conditions (C) and (D).
The reader should note that to achieve Conditions
(B) and (D), an opponent would have to remotely access
communication systems related to the breaker and the syn-
chrophasor sensor of the target generator, respectively. In
protected information systems, this would require that the
attacker illicitly infiltrate the corresponding data transmission
systems. For Condition (B), the opponent would have to inject
fabricated breaker control signals into the communication
network. For Condition (D), the opponent would have to
infiltrate the associated SCADA or synchrophasor network
to intercept generator state information.
Cyber intrusion or corruption of distributed systems is a
necessary assumption for vulnerability analysis especially
when studying system resilience. Numerous practical exam-
ples of cyber weaknesses in smart grid communication net-
works have been documented [21] that range from exploiting
holes in well known operating systems used by measurement
and control devices to distribution-area attacks such as the
hijacking of smart meters that can enable the effective shut-
ting on/off of loads to provide the type of switching attack
presented in this paper. The types of cyber intrusions nec-
essary to be able to execute a coordinated variable structure
switching attack are specific to the actual protocols, software
and hardware architecture and is beyond the scope of this
work.
III. ATTACK EXISTENCE AND DYNAMICS
Assuming Conditions (A) to (D) of Section II-B hold,
the existence of a coordinated variable-structure switching
vulnerability for a given smart grid is directly related to
the existence of a sliding mode for the associated breaker
switched system. Sliding mode existence for the general class
of systems in Eq. (1) is an open problem. Thus, in this section
we provide existence conditions for incrementally linear sub-
systems to facilitate attack construction in Section IV. More-
over, we characterize the dynamics and stability properties of
this class of systems during sliding mode behavior to better
understand the impact of the attack. Our formulation conve-
niently represents the switching of a single corrupted circuit
breaker or switch, but can be naturally scaled to multiple
switches by increasing the number of subsystems.
The reasons for the incrementally linear assumption are
three-fold. First, because many power system configurations
can be approximated as linear about a local range of operating
conditions, it allows for representation of a useful class; in
SectionVwe demonstrate how one can successfully construct
and execute attacks even on nonlinear power system models
using this linearized model. Second, the linear approximation
does not carry the same limitations for system destabiliza-
tion as it would for stabilization. For stabilization, model
linearization expands the region of convergence over the
original nonlinear system making the system appear more
stable than it really is. In contrast, we contend that such
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approximations for destabilization provide conservative
impacts often demonstrating richer disruptions in the actual
nonlinear systems. Finally, demonstrating the construction
of an attack using linearized models provides intuition as to
the practical feasibility of identifying such attacks with only
approximate information.
A. SLIDING MODE EXISTENCE
In general, the sliding mode existence condition is given
by [16] (note: s˙(x) is the time derivative of s(x)):
s(x)s˙(x) < 0 for s(x) 6= 0. (3)
1) NONLINEAR SUBSYSTEMS
Typically, sliding mode existence is local for nonlinear
time-varying dynamics. Determining analytic existence con-
ditions, in the form of parameter ranges for a structure of
nonlinear dynamics, is often intractable. However, a visual
approach employing overlapping phase portraits of the sub-
systems can be used based on the following interpretation.
Eq. (3) is equivalent to the following:
lim
s(x)→0+
s˙(x) < 0 and lim
s(x)→0−
s˙(x) > 0. (4)
The above equation implies that if we consider the state space
to be partitioned into two regions corresponding to s(x) > 0
and s(x) < 0 then if the state is on, say, the s(x) > 0
(s(x) < 0) side, its trajectory will be attracted to the other
side (and across s(x) = 0) due to the requirement on the rate
of change of s(x) that s˙(x) < 0 (s˙(x) > 0). The overall effect
is an attraction to the s(x) = 0 surface whereby once the
state crosses s(x) = 0 from one side to the other, it crosses
right back. Visually in state-space, Eq. (3) can be evaluated
by employing overlapping phase portraits of the subsystems
and analyzing whether the state trajectories of the appropriate
subsystems on either side of the surface push the state back to
the sliding surface. Of course, the visual approach is limited
to situations in which dimensionality is small.
2) (INCREMENTALLY) LINEAR SUBSYSTEMS
Analytically, we present the following theorem regarding the
existence of a sliding mode for incrementally linear subsys-
tem dynamics.
Theorem 1 (Existence of a Sliding Mode). Given the
variable structure system:
x˙ =
{
A1x + b1, s(x) > 0
A2x + b2, s(x) ≤ 0 (5)
where x ∈ Rn×1, Ai ∈ Rn×n, b1 ∈ Rn×1 and s(x) = Cx ∈
R for constant row vector C = [c1 c2 · · · cn] ∈ R1×n the
necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of the sliding
mode are: {
C(A1x + b1) < 0, s(x) > 0
C(A2x + b2) > 0, s(x) < 0 . (6)
Proof: The overall system of Eq. (5) can be represented
as (for simplicity we denote s(x) as s):
x˙ =
[
1+ sgn(s)
2
]
(A1x + b1)+
[
1− sgn(s)
2
]
(A2x + b2)
(7)
where sgn(s) = 1 for s > 0 and sgn(s) = −1 for s ≤ 0.
From Eq. (3) a sliding mode exists if and only if ss˙ < 0; we
determine the conditions to guarantee this inequality where
we make use that s sgn(s) = |s|:
ss˙ = sCx˙ = sC
{[
1+ sgn(s)
2
]
(A1x + b1)
+
[
1− sgn(s)
2
]
(A2x + b2)
}
= 1
2
sC(A1 + A2)x + 12 |s|C(A1 − A2)x
= 1
2
(s+ |s|)C(A1x + b1)+ 12(s− |s|)C(A2x + b2)
which is equivalent to (6) if we impose ss˙ < 0 and where we
make use of the fact that s+|s| > 0 and s−|s| = 0 for s > 0,
and s+ |s| = 0 and s− |s| < 0 for s < 0.
Thus, Condition (6) is necessary and sufficient to guarantee
that ss˙ < 0 and represents a convenient test for the existence
of a sliding mode. An opponent would have to determine a
vector C = [c1 c2 · · · cn] (or an associated vector range)
such that (6) holds for a region in state space.
The reader should note that (6) implies that the range of C
for which the inequalities exist is in general dependent on the
values of the state x. This implies that the attraction condition
exists for a given neighborhood of x and hence is local. To
employ this criterion, an opponent would consider the neigh-
borhood about the current equilibrium point x∗, x ∈ N (x∗),
and select a C such that sC(A1x + b1) < 0 for s > 0 and
sC(A2x + b2) > 0 for s < 0 for x ∈ N (x∗).
We emphasize that the conditions above only guarantee
attraction to the s = 0 surface and do not imply stability
properties of the system. The next theorem characterizes the
behavior of the state once attracted to the sliding surface thus
providing insight on its stability properties.
B. SLIDING MODE DYNAMICS
A sliding mode provides a steering quality to an opponent to
shift a grid to a more vulnerable state. If a sliding mode is
unstable, the state will attract to s = 0 and then continue on
the surface to infinity. In the stable case, it will eventually
converge to an equilibrium point on the s = 0 surface. To
characterize the sliding mode dynamics and stability proper-
ties, we present the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Sliding Mode Dynamics). For the variable
structure system:
x˙ =
{
A1x + b1, s(x) > 0
A2x + b2, s(x) ≤ 0
where x ∈ Rn×1, Ai ∈ Rn×n and bi ∈ Rn×1, assume that a
sliding mode for s = Cx, C ∈ R1×n, exists. Then, the sliding
mode dynamics can be characterized by G(x) as follows:
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x˙ = G(x) (8)
where
G(x) = 1
2
[(A1 + A2)x + (b1 + b2)]− 12[(A1 − A2)x
+ (b1 − b2)] · C [(A1 + A2)x + (b1 + b2)]C [(A1 − A2)x + (b1 − b2)]
Moreover, the local stability properties of the system about
a neighborhood of the equilibrium point x∗ ∈ Rn×1 can be
determined stable if all non-trivial eigenvalues of G(x∗) are
on the left half plane and unstable otherwise.
proof: We assign: Ga(x) = 12 [(A1 + A2)x + (b1 + b2)]
and Gd (x) = 12 [(A1 − A2)x + (b1 − b2)]. Then, the variable
structure system can be represented in the form of a control
system:  x˙ = Ga(x)+ Gd (x)us = Cxu = sgn(s). (9)
where u ∈ R is defined for a given s = Cx. Given slid-
ing mode existence, we can characterize its traversal along
s(x) = 0 using the method of equivalent control [17]. Here,
we have:
s˙ = Cx˙ = CGa(x)+ CGd (x)u. (10)
For the state confined on the sliding surface, s = s˙ = 0.
We solve for the equivalent control ueq by setting Eq. (10) to
zero and solving for u. This gives ueq = −[CGd (x)]−1CGa(x)
where the reader should note that CGa(x),CGd (x) ∈ R. The
effective system dynamics on the sliding mode is therefore:
x˙ = Ga(x)+ Gd (x)ueq
= 1
2
[(A1 + A2)x + (b1 + b2)]
−1
2
[(A1 − A2)x + (b1 − b2)]
·C [(A1 + A2)x + (b1 + b2)]
C [(A1 − A2)x + (b1 − b2)]
= G(x).
The local stability properties easily follow by applying lin-
earization and Theorems 15 and 27 of [18]. 
Eqs. 8 and 9 of Theorem III-B describe the slid-
ing mode dynamics as a combination of the aver-
age (i.e., 12 [(A1 + A2)x + (b1 + b2)]) and difference (i.e,
1
2 [(A1 − A2)x + (b1 − b2)]) of the individual subsystem
dynamics. The state- and sliding surface-dependent weight
C[(A1+A2)x+(b1+b2)]
C[(A1−A2)x+(b1−b2)] ∈ R scales the difference dynamics
relative to the average dynamics to maintain the system on the
sliding surface. Selection ofC and hence the particular sliding
mode to use for switching will have an effect on the behavior
of the state. IfC is more aligned (via the dot product measure)
to the average dynamics, then the difference dynamics have
greater influence than the average and vice versa.
For an attack, an opponent is concerned with power flow
disruption and may be most interested in the stability proper-
ties of the sliding mode. Thus, unstable sliding modes can be
leveraged through persistent switching until significant dis-
ruption results. Although perhaps not immediately obvious,
stable sliding modes can also be leveraged as we demonstrate
in Section V to steer the system across the stability boundary
of one of the subsystems and then terminate switching to
enable passive disruption.
IV. ATTACK CONSTRUCTION
Employing our framework, we provide the steps necessary
for attack construction and apply it to a case study involv-
ing the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC)
3-machine system, 9-bus system. The reader should note that,
from our experience, existence of a sliding mode and hence
ability to construct the attack for a target generator in the
proximity of a corrupted breaker is typically high for most
test systems considered.
A. STAGES OF ATTACK CONSTRUCTION
The stages of an attack construction are as follows.
1) Mathematically represent the system under the switch-
ing attack as a variable structure system whereby the
switching rule s(x) remains general.
2) For general nonlinear systems, identify the equilibrium
points and linearize the system about the equilibrium
points.
3) Determine the existence of and identify a class of slid-
ing modes using Theorem III-A.2.
4) Characterize the dynamical and stability properties of
the sliding modes using Theorem III-B.
5) Select and assign an identified sliding surface to s(x)
for attack implementation.
We contend that the steps above apply to general nonlinear
models of power system dynamics; the linearization stage is
critical to make use of Theorems III-A.2 and III-B. However,
for general nonlinear systems, pictorial approaches for iden-
tification of sliding modes are also possible as mentioned in
Section III-A. A phase portrait of each nonlinear subsystem
must be determined identifying stable foci and saddle points.
These phase portraits must then be overlapped. A sliding
surface s(x) = 0 may be identified visually if in the vicinity
of s(x) = 0, the trajectory vectors of the subsystems point
toward the switching surface in opposite directions; this
ensures that the state trajectory of the switched system will
be driven to the switching surface and will stay within a
neighborhood of it. The interested reader is referred to [17].
We employ the visual approach to sliding mode identification
as a brief check to verify our linearized model results, but
would not typically be used by an opponent for attack con-
struction.
A natural approach to attacking a power grid would be
to exploit the unstable sliding mode of a system whereby
the state is steered to an arbitrarily large value. However,
the reader should note that it is possible to exploit both
unstable and stable sliding modes for effective power system
disruption.
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FIGURE 3. Single machine infinite bus system model. The
opponent coordinates switching of the load PL based on the
values of Generator G1’s state x = [δ1ω1]T .
To illustrate the use of our variable structure theory
approach, we demonstrate the construction of an attack for the
well known single machine infinite bus (SMIB) power system
model presented in Fig. 3.
B. VARIABLE STRUCTURE REPRESENTATION
A typical power system is piecewise time-invariant; that is,
within a short window of time representing the attack duration
before disruption, the system parameters can be considered to
be constant. Thus, for the purposes of our modeling for attack
construction, we make use of time-invariant parameters in a
swing equation-based model of the power system. Thus, the
SMIB model can be expressed as [22]:
δ˙1 =ω1
M1ω˙1 =PM1 − E21G11
− sLPL − E1E∞B1∞ sin δ1 − D1ω1
=P1 − C1∞ sin δ1 − D1ω1
(11)
where δ1 and ω1 are the rotor angle and rotor speed deviation
of Generator G1, respectively, and collectively form the state
x = [δ1 ω1]T , M1, D1, E1, PM1 are the moment of inertia,
damping coefficient, internal voltage and mechanical power
ofG1, respectively, E∞ is the voltage at the infinite bus, PL is
the local load at Bus 1, sL is the load switch status (sL = 1,
if the load is connected; sL = 0, otherwise), and B1∞ is
the transfer susceptance of the line between Bus 1 and the
infinite bus. We assign P1 = PM1 − E21G11 − sLPL and
C1∞ = E1E∞B1∞.
Assuming that C1∞ = 1,D1 = 0.1,M1 = 0.1, PM1 −
E21G11 − PL = 0, PM1 − E21G11 = 0.9, the overall variable
structure system can be represented as:
A1 :
{
δ˙1 = ω1
ω˙1 = −10 sin δ1 − ω1 if sL = 1
A2 :
{
δ˙1 = ω1
ω˙1 = 9− 10 sin δ1 − ω1 if sL = 0
. (12)
It is straightforward to determine from Eq. (12) that system
A1’s stable foci are at (2npi, 0) and the saddle points are at
(2npi + pi, 0) where n ∈ Z as shown in the phase portrait of
Fig. 4(a). Any point within a stability boundary will converge
to the corresponding stable focus. Similarly, for system A2,
the stable foci are at (2npi+1.1198, 0) and (2npi+2.0218, 0),
and the saddle points are at (2npi+2.0218, 0) as shown in the
phase portrait of Fig. 4(b).
As discussed in Section IV-A, for a general nonlinear
system the existence of a sliding mode can be determined
pictorially from the overlapping phase portraits. Here, one
interprets Eq. (3) visually in state space whereby a sliding
surface s(x) = 0 must be found such that in the neighbor-
hood of this surface the trajectory vectors of each subsystem
point toward the switching surface but in opposite directions.
The switching between subsystems would be assigned such
that when on one side of the sliding surface s(x) = 0,
the system would switch to the subsystem with trajecto-
ries pointing toward that surface. This ensures that the state
trajectory of the variable structure system will be driven
to the switching surface and will stay within a region of
it [17].
To determine the possibility of a sliding mode in this way,
the overlapping phase portraits are shown in Fig. 4(c). Visual
inspection suggests there are multiple possibilities for linear
sliding surfaces such as s = 6δ1 + ω1. However, in the next
section we demonstrate the utilization of Theorems III-A.2
and III-B on the linearized system to determine the range of
possible sliding surfaces for attack. In this way, we demon-
FIGURE 4. Individual and overlapping phase portraits of subsystems of Eq. (12). (a) Phase portrait of system A1. (b) Phase portrait
of system A2. (c) Close-up of overlapping phase portraits.
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strate the mathematical and numerical ease in determining
such a vulnerability.
C. SMIB ATTACK CONSTRUCTION
To apply Theorems III-A.2 and III-B to our SMIB power sys-
tem model of Eq. (12), we must linearize its representation.
Approximating sin δ1 ≈ δ1 for δ1 small and assuming s > 0
(s ≤ 0) corresponds to the load switch being closed to give
A1 (open to give A2), we obtain:
δ˙1 = ω1
ω˙1 =
{−10δ1 − ω1, s > 0
9− 10δ1 − ω1, s ≤ 0
(13)
corresponding to A1 = A2 =
[
0 1
−10 −1
]
, b1 =
[
0 0
]T and
b2 =
[
0 9
]T in (5). Theorem III-A.2 provides the following
sliding mode existence conditions for s = c1δ1 + c2ω1:{
c1ω1 − 10c2δ1 − c2ω1 < 0 for c1δ1 + c2ω1 > 0
c1ω1 − 10c2δ1 − c2ω1 + 9c2 > 0 for c1δ1 + c2ω1 < 0 .
(14)
Fig. 5 illustrates this overall region; the regions delineated
s < 0 and s > 0 denote the values of (c1, c2) for which
c1ω1−10c2δ1−c2ω1 < 0 and c1ω1−10c2δ1−c2ω1+9c2 > 0
about x∗ = [1.1198 0]T , respectively. We can construct an
attack by selecting C = [6 1] corresponding to s = 6δ1+ω1.
Applying Theorem III-B, we find that it is a stable sliding
mode.
V. ATTACK EXECUTION AND IMPACT
In this section we execute a coordinated variable struc-
ture switching attack using our sliding mode selection of
s = 6δ1 + ω1 on the nonlinear SMIB and a more realistic
test system to demonstrate the value of Theorems III-A.2 and
III-B for attack construction on linearized models. Our target
in both cases is GeneratorG1 and the corrupted breaker is that
associated with load switching.
FIGURE 5. Valid sliding mode parameter region about
neighborhood of x∗ = [1.1198 0]T .
A. NONLINEAR SMIB CASE STUDY
Consider application of a switching attack on the nonlinear
SMIB model of Eq. (12). We assume that the load is initially
disconnected (i.e., is at A2) and apply the attack from 0 to
2.5 seconds, which drives the system trajectory across the
stability boundary of subsystem A2 at which time the attack
finally switches the system dynamics to A2 permanently as
observed in Fig. 6(a). Thus, G1 is destabilized within sec-
onds by steering its state over the stability boundary via the
switching attack. The reader should note that as discussed
s = 6δ1+ω1 is a stable sliding mode. Thus, persistent switch-
ing (opposed to that limited to 2.5 s) will result in steering the
power system from the initial stable focus of (1.1198, 0) to the
stable focus of (0, 0) as presented in Fig. 6(b).
FIGURE 6. Switching attack on System (12) for s = 6δ1 + ω1. (a) Stop time of 2.5 seconds.(b) No stop time.
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FIGURE 7. One-line diagram of revised WECC system.
B. WECC 3-GENERATOR, 9-BUS CASE STUDY
To further demonstrate the utility of the attack, we consider
a variant of the well-knownWestern Electricity Coordinating
Council (WECC) 3-machine, 9-bus system [23] presented in
Fig. 7. This system can be approximated with the second
order nonlinear SMIB model of Eq. (12). Thus, we apply the
same sliding surface s = 6δ1 + ω1 for attack.
The test system in question is simulated in PSCAD (Power
SystemComputer Aided Design, https://hvdc.ca/pscad/) soft-
ware, one of the most popular power system simulation tools.
PSCAD enables the modeling of generator controls including
governors and exciters as well as protective relays to demon-
strate the potential of our approach to disrupt real power sys-
tem operation. The test system is based on theWECC system,
with the addition of a transmission line, a local load, and a
gas turbine generator. Here, the base MVA is 100, the system
normal frequency is 60 Hz and the generator parameters are
shown in Table 1. The transmission line connecting Generator
G1 and the infinite bus are modeled using an inductor of
0.014 H. The local load PL is chosen to be 32.4MWmodeled
using a constant resistor. The PSCAD step size was chosen to
be 50 µs.
For consistent comparison, simulations of the WECC sys-
tem are presented for the same system initial conditions and
stop time as employed for the second order nonlinear SMIB
model of the previous section. Specifically, the initial state of
the WECC system is set to to the stable focus of (1.1198, 0).
If s > 0, the system dynamics switch to system A1 and if
s ≤ 0, they switch to A2. The switching attack is applied
from 0.2248 to 2.7248 seconds (the non-zero start time is
necessary for PSCAD implementation of the attacked sys-
tem), which once again drives the system trajectory across
the stability boundary of A2 at which point the switch is
permanently set to A2 making the system unstable. The fre-
quency relays of all generators including G1 are set to trip
for a deviation more than ±5% of the nominal frequency
(of 2pi × 60 = 377 rad/s), which corresponds to 18.8
rad/sec; in this way we also take into account the response of
the non-corrupted breakers to the switching attack. PSCAD
simulations demonstrate in Fig. 8(a) how at time 2.7248
seconds (which corresponds to 2.5 seconds in the SMIB
TABLE 1. Generator parameters for Fig. 7 system.
simulation due to the delayed start time), the system state
diverges. The deviation from nominal frequency, phase angle
and output voltage of GeneratorG1 during the attack is shown
in Fig. 8(b)–(d), respectively. As observed, the frequency and
voltage of G1 become unstable right after application of the
attack.
To illustrate how the sliding mode exploited for the attack
is in fact stable, the same coordinated switching is applied
indefinitely with results presented in Fig. 9.
C. EFFICACY OF LINEARIZED RESULTS
We assert that the attack theory and analysis presented in
this paper has the potential to be employed, in part, as a tool
to understand possibility vulnerabilities in future smart grid
systems as well as the worst-case impact of switching attacks.
One measure of the degree of weakness exhibited by a system
could relate to the range of possible sliding modes available
for an opponent to exploit.
For this reason, Theorem III-A.2 can be a useful tool when
applied to a linearized smart grid system. To demonstrate the
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FIGURE 8. PSCAD simulation results of WECC system for s = 6δ1 + ω1 switching from 0 to 2.5 seconds. (a) System state
trajectory. (b) G1 deviation from nominal frequency. (c) G1 phase angle. (d) G1 output voltage.
FIGURE 9. PSCAD simulation results of WECC system in the presence of persistent variable structure switching for
s = 6δ1 + ω1 from 0 seconds. (a) System state trajectory. (b) G1 deviation from nominal frequency. (c) G1 phase angle.(d) G1 output voltage.
value of the linearized results, we present in Table 2 the ranges
of c1 corresponding to the existence or lack of sliding mode
for the three systems: linearized SMIB, nonlinear SMIB and
high-order WECC. It is clear that there is a large overlap in
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TABLE 2. Empirical existence of sliding surface s = c1δ1 + ω1 for
linearized SMIB, nonlinear SMIB, nonlinear SMIB with parameter
errors and WECC test system. Simulation tests were conducted
for c1 ∈ Z and −20 ≤ c1 ≤ 20.
the existence of a sliding mode in both the nonlinear and lin-
earized versions demonstrating how our approximation does
not significantly affect the degree of vulnerability present in
the system.
VI. LIMITATIONS ON ATTACKER KNOWLEDGE
To construct and apply a successful coordinated variable
structure switching attack, an opponent would need to lever-
age cyber intrusion to enable Conditions (B) and (D) of
Section II-B as well as have a local model of the smart grid
in the proximity of the target and corrupt breaker.
Given the need for timed coordination in the attack, switch-
ing control is imperative for success. However, in this section,
we assess the effect of limitations on opponent knowledge to
the ability to construct and execute an attack. We focus on
model error, which affects the ability to construct a feasible
attack and strategies to contend with only partial state infor-
mation, which affects attack execution.
A. MODEL PARAMETER ERROR
Questions naturally arise as to the effects of model error
on attack construction. Consider the system of (12) with
parameter error:
A1 :
{
δ˙1 = 0(1+ ε11)+ (1+ ε12)ω1
ω˙1 = (−10+ ε13) sin δ1 + (−1+ ε14)ω1
A2 :
{
δ˙1 = 0(1+ ε21)+ (1+ ε22)ω1
ω˙1 = 9+ (−10+ ε23) sin δ1 + (−1+ ε24)ω1.
(15)
where {εij} are specific parameter error values. The existence
conditions of Theorem III-A.2 become:
c1(1+ ε12)ω1 − 10c2(1+ ε13)δ1 − c2(1+ ε14)ω1 < 0
for c1δ1 + c2ω1 > 0
c1(1+ ε22)ω1 − 10c2(1+ ε23)δ1 − c2(1+ ε24)ω1
+9c2 > 0
for c1δ1 + c2ω1 < 0
Fig. 10 illustrates the effects of errors; the associated change
in slope of the region boundaries due to parameter errors
result in both false positives and false negatives for the deter-
mination of C . Study of Fig. 10 reveals that a robust strategy
for the selection of C would be to select a value internal to
the region boundaries. If bounds on εij are available, then it is
FIGURE 10. Effect of model error on sliding mode identification.
Selection of C = [6 1] is internal to the boundaries and
guarantees robustness against a degree of model error.
FIGURE 11. SMIB system approximation for partial state
estimation.
possible guarantee a robust selection of C that is far enough
from the boundaries.
B. PARTIAL STATE INFORMATION
The opponent may gain target state information through cyber
intrusion and eavesdropping. The feasibility of this depends
on the communication media and protocols used; further
discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.
In this section, we investigate the efficacy of our attack
approach when only partial state information is available.
Here, we assume that the opponent aims to estimate the miss-
ing state information, from say other available information,
resulting in an increase in attack complexity.
We consider the case in which an attack is applied to the
revised WECC test system of Fig. 7. We assume that the
Generator G1 frequency ω1 is known to the opponent, but the
rotor angle δ1 must be estimated in some way. Specifically,
we assume as an example the terminal voltage and current of
an associated transmission line is known and must be used in
the estimation of δ1.
Modeling the standard WECC system in relation to G1
as a SMIB system, we obtain the system in Fig. 11.
Applying Kirchoff’s law gives:
E1 6 δ1 = jX ′d I 6 α + E 6 θ
= (E cos θ − X ′d I · sinα)+ j(E sin θ − X ′d I cosα)
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where E1 6 δ1 is the generator internal voltage, jX ′d is the
impedance of transmission line, I 6 α is the current of trans-
mission line and E 6 θ is the terminal voltage. Thus, the gen-
erator internal voltage E1 and phase angle δ1 can be estimated
using the following equations:
E1 =
√
(E cos θ − X ′d I · sinα)2 + (E sin θ − X ′d I cosα)2
(16)
and tan δ1 = E sin θ+X
′
d I cosα
E cos θ−X ′d I sinα .
Given the approximation that tan δ1 ≈ δ1 when δ1 is small,
we have
δ1 ≈ tan δ1 = E sin θ + X
′
d I cosα
E cos θ − X ′d I sinα
. (17)
Therefore, δ1 can be estimated via the terminal voltage E 6 θ
and current I 6 α of transmission line as follows:[
δˆ1
ω1
]
=
[
E sin θ+X ′d I cosα
E cos θ−X ′d I sinα
ω1
]
. (18)
Using this estimation approach, we apply the attack from
0 to 2.5 seconds on a PSCAD simulation of the test system
of Fig 7; as shown in Fig. 12, the system dynamics follow
the sliding mode to subsequently produce instability and
disruption.
VII. RELATED WORK
Our work builds on the body of recent research that has
focused on the interaction between the cyber and physical
aspects of a smart grid to aid in vulnerability analysis takes
on a variety of flavors. These techniques can be classified
into a number of categories. Static approaches [1] consider
the topological information about the smart grid in order
to study vulnerabilities often using graph-theoretic means.
Compact relationships between system components that can
lead to cascading corruption and failure are identified. Empir-
ical approaches [12]–[15] harness research and development
of realistic communications and power systems simulators.
These two forms of simulators are combined such that an
attack is applied in the communication simulator that trans-
fers data to the power systems simulator which makes deci-
sions based on this possibly corrupt information. Typical
traditional power system reliability metrics are used to assess
impact of the cyber attacks. Such approaches are valuable
in providing indications of attack impacts, but often require
exhaustive ‘what-if’ forms of attack case analysis that are
limited from providing general principles for grid design. In
cyber-physical leakage approaches [24], [25] confidentiality
of the cyber network is studied by identifying how voltage
and current measurements of the physical power system can
be successfully analyzed for any clues about cyber proto-
col activity. Testbed research addresses the exploration of
practical vulnerabilities through SCADA testbed develop-
ment and construction [11], [12]. Although some insights
on how to protection industrial control systems for SCADA
are provided. There exists room to develop more prescriptive
FIGURE 12. Coordinated switching attack with partial state
knowledge on test system of Fig. 7. (a) G1 phase angle. (b) G1
deviation from nominal frequency. (c) Switch Status.
approaches to provide more general design guidelines for
future smart grid systems.
VIII. FINAL REMARKS
A grand challenge in cyber-physical systems research is the
development of models that elegantly interface the discrete-
time characteristics of the cyber infrastructure with the analog
nature of the physical system. We believe that our use of
variable structure system theory conveniently interfaces the
switching cyber-control within power systems to provide a
novel way to understand the cyber-physical interaction and in
the case of this paper gain insight into new forms of vulner-
ability. In addition, it lends itself to a natural mathematical
framework and formalism useful for automatic identification
of vulnerabilities. The use of dynamical systems allows for
flexible granularity and can conveniently be implemented for
simulation.
Our work demonstrates the efficacy of coordinated variable
structure switching attacks by demonstrating how attack con-
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struction on a linearized version of the system still executes
on nonlinear and realistic models of the system.Moreover, the
attack can be successful even under conditions of model error
and partial state knowledge. Future work will aim to apply
variable structure system theory to model robotics systems as
discussed in [26] and [27] and generalized social networking
contexts when switched dynamics may be appropriate for
representing simple cyber-assisted human decision-making
amongst finite choices such as those made when gambling
or in elections.
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